Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2016

Greg J. Pope, Appellant, v. Carmen R. Pope, Appellee.
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Pope v. Pope, No. 20150869 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2016).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3127

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GREG J. POPE,
Appellant,
Case. No. 20150869-CA

V.

CARMEN R. POPE,
Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HON. BARRY G. LAWRENCE, CASE NO. 134904171

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

ORAL ARGUMENT rs REQUESTED
Russell Yauncey
357 S. 200 E. Suite 103
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Marshall Thompson ( 14811)
THOMPSON APPEALS
222 S. Main Street, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorneys for the Appellee

Attorney for the Appellant
FILED

UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

MAR 15 2016

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GREG J. POPE,
Appellant,
Case. No. 20150869-CA

v.

CARMEN R. POPE,
Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD illDICIAL DISTRICT COURT~
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HON. BARRY G. LAWRENCE, CASE NO. 134904171

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED
Russell Y auncey
357 S. 200 E. Suite I 03
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Marshall Thompson ( 14811)
THOMPSON APPEALS
222 S. Main Street, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorneys for the Appellee

Attorney for the Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ....................................................................... iii
ISSUES PRESENTED ............................................................................................ iii
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS ................................................ v
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... vi
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................................................................. vi
STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................... viii
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................... 1

I. The trial court erred by giving credit to Mother's salacious and entirely
unsubstantiated allegation that Father was a prostitute ........................................ 1
A. The prostitution allegations hanned Father's substantial rights in the
proceeding ........................................................................................................ 5
II. The Court's findings are insufficient to support its conclusion that Father
endangered the children by leaving them alone a night. ...................................... 7
III. The trial court favored a step-parent household over a multigenerational
household without a sufficient basis in the evidence ........................................... 9
IV. The trial court erred in considering only standardized test scores compared
to diversity in making a determination about which school the children should
attend .................................................................................................................. 12
V. Mother's fiance should not have been allowed to testify .............................. 13
VI. Cumulative error has prejudiced Father.. ..................................................... 16
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 17
ADDENDUM ........................................................................................................ 18
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ..................................................................... 18
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .............................................................................. 18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993) ......................................... iv
Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472,476 (Utah App. 1991) ............................ .iii
In re B.T.D., 2003 UT App 99, ,r 12, 68 P.3d 1021 ................................................ iv
Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987) ......................................... 9
Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1991) ............................................. 1, 7, 9
State v. Billsie, 2006 UT 13, ,r 6, 131 P.3d 239 ................................................ iv, 14
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) .......................................... v, 6, 16
State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,r 42, 326 P.3d 645 ............................................... 1, 7
Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2(2)(a), (f) (LexisNexis 2013) .................................... 12

Other Authorities
Daphne A. Lofquist, Multigenerational Households: 2009-2011),
www.Census.gov (October 2012), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/acsbr11-03.pdf .................................... 10
Richard Fry and Jeffrey S. Passel, In Post-Recession Era, Young Adults Drive

Continuing Rise in Multi-Generational Living, Pew Research Center (July 17,
2014), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/07/17/inpostrecession-era-young-adults-drive-continuing-rise-in-multi-generationalliving/#fu-19695-1 ............................................................................................. 10

Rules
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) ....................................................................................... iii, I, 7
Utah R. Civ. P. 61 .................................................................................................... 5
Utah R. Evid. 615 ................................................................................................... 13

11

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the matter based on Utah
Code section 78A-4-103(2)(h).

ISSUES PRESENTED
Issue I: The trial court's findings that Mother was credible and telling the truth
when she testified that Father had engaged in prostitution for many years and the

trial court's findings that Father lacked credibility for denying the baseless charges
was clearly erroneous and should be reversed.

Standard of review: "Findings of fact based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside wtless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witness."
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

Preservation: R. 714-15.

Issue II: The trial court's findings were insufficient to support its conclusion that
Father had put the children at risk by leaving them in the house with their
grandmother while he worked at night.

Standard of review: "A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
concerns the trial court's findings of fact. Those findings will not be disturbed
unless they are clearly erroneous." Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472,476
(Utah App. 1991 ).

Preservation: R. 715-16.

111

Issue III: The ttial court erred by expressing a preference for a step-parent
household over a multigenerational household without any reasonable basis in
evidence.

Standard of review: "A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
G

concerns the trial court's findings of fact. Those findings will not be disturbed
unless they are clearly erroneous." Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472,476
(Utah App. 1991).

Preservation: R. 719-20.
Issue IV: The trial court erred by ordering the children to change elementary
schools without making a finding that it would be in their best interests.

Standard of review: The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that
is reviewed for correctness. See In re B.T.D., 2003 UT App 99,

,r 12, 68 P.3d

1021. A trial court's findings of fact will not be overturned unless they are clearly
erroneous, but "to ensure the court acted within its broad discretion, the facts and
reasons for the court's decision must be set forth fully in appropriate findings and
conclusions." See Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993)
( citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Preservation: R. 716-17.
Issue V: The trial court erred by having Mother's fiance testify even though the
exclusionary 1ule had been invoked and he had been present in the courtroom the
entire day.

lV

Standard of review: A trial cowt' s decision to exempt a witness from
exclusion under rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. See State v. Billsie, 2006 UT 13, 'ff 6, 131 P.3d 239.

Preservation: R. 717-18; 1036-37.
Issue VI: The cumulative effect of the several errors requires a remand even if
some errors, by themselves, are deemed harmless.

Standard of review: Under the doctrine of cumulative error, an appellate
court will reverse if the several errors undermine the court's confidence that a fair
trial was had. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993).

Preservation: R. 720.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code section 30-3-10.2(2)(a), (f).
In determining whether the best interest of a child will be served by ordering joint
legal custody, the court shall consider the following factors: (a) whether the
physical, psychological, and emotional needs and development of the child will
benefit from joint legal or physical custody; [and] ... (f) the preference of the
child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an
intelligent preference as to joint legal or physical custody[.]

Rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
At a party's request, the court must order witnesses excluded so that they cannot
hear other witnesses' testimony. Or the court may do so on its own. But this rule

V

does not authorize excluding ... a person whose presence a party shows to be
essential to presenting the party's claim or defense.

STATEMENT OF 'fHE CASE
Father appeals from the trial court's Memorandum Decision, Order,
Findings of Pact and Conclusions of Law entered on June 19, 2015. R. 669-701.
Father filed a timely motion under rule 52(b) and rule 59 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure on July 6 2015. R. 709-10. 1 The trial court issued a Ruling and
Order on Pending Motions on September 22, 2015, that denied Father's postjudgment motion. R. 879. Father filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 921.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when it gave any weight to Mother's baseless claim
that Father was a prostitute for several years before their separation. Father denied
all the allegation and Mother was unable to produce a single piece of
corroborating evidence. In fact, she claims that she deleted all the evidence.
Although the trial court did not find sufficient evidence to support a criminal
charge or to conclude that Father had endangered the children, the trial court did
determine that Mother's testimony was credible, that the prostitution allegations

1

This was timely because July 4, 2015, fell on a Saturday, which caused the
holiday to be observed in the State of Utah on Friday, July 3, 2015. As a result, the
time for filing the post-judgment motion was extended to the following Monday,
which was July 6, 2015.
Vl

reflected poorly on Father's moral character, and that Father's denial's lacked
credibility. This harmful conclusion lacked sufficient basis in evidence.
It was etTor for the trial court to conclude that Father had put his children at
risk by leaving them alone every night while he worked a graveyard shift because
it was uncontroverted that Grandmother was at home with the children every night
and could hear them if they needed anything.
The trial court also erred in determining that Father's living arrangements
were not ideal even though there was no evidence that would suggest it was
unstable or W1sustainable in any way. In doing so, the trial court expressed an
improper preference for step-parent households over multigenerational
households.
It was error for the trial court to order the children to change elementary
schools without considering the children's emotional needs and preference. In
determining that an elementary school near Mother was better for the children than
the elementary school they had attended for two school years, the trial court only
considered standardized test scores and diversity.
Over Father's objections, Mother's fiance was allowed to testify even
though the exclusionary rule had been invoked and he had remained in the
courtroom during the whole first day of trial. This error was prejudicial because
the fiance was able to testify about things that Mother had said in her testimony.
Finally, the doctrine of cumulative error requires reversal even if any single
issue is deemed to be harmless in isolation.
vn

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Father and Mother, who have two minor children together, filed for divorce
in August of 2013. R. 1-15. After separating, Father moved into the basement
apartment of his mother's home in Salt Lake City, Utah. R. 671. Mother stayed in
the marital home and then later moved to a townhouse in Draper, Utah. R. 671.
She was later engaged to a man she met the same month that the divorce was filed.
R. 1090. They were engaged three months later. R. 1090. On October 8, 2013, a

commissioner announced temporary orders for custody and parent time. R. 376.
On February 19, 2014, the trial court entered the same temporary orders
maintaining full joint physical and legal custody of the children. R. 3 93. Parent
time was split evenly between Mother and Father. R. 393. Under this arrangement,
the children continued to attend elementary school at an ethnically diverse
elementary school in Father's neighborhood where they had been thriving both
socially and academically. R. 672. Father's schedule revolved around the
children's schedule, and he continued to work nights as a janitor at high school
that was ten minutes away. R. 671,672. By maintaining his night schedule, Father
was able to spend much of his time volunteering at the children's school and was
able to eat lunch with his children every day. R. 671, 935; see also Petitioner's
Exhibit 1, 10.. By all accounts, Father is a good parent with "genuine love for his
children." T. 671.
While Father was working from 9 p.m. to 2 a.m. at the nearby high school,
he would leave the children in the care of his mother (Grandmother) who testified
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that she was at home every evening and could hear if the children needed
anything. R. 672. By following this schedule, Father was able to continue to be the
primaiy caregiver to the children without using outside daycare services. R. 673.
The children shared a room in the two-bedroom basement apartment of the house
that had a separate entrance. R. 672. In March 2015:, after living in this
arrangement for almost two years, a trial was held to establish a permanent
arrangement. R. 669.

Father's finances and living arrangements
During the trial, Father's attorney argued that living in an apartment in his
mother's home was "beneficial for both [Father] and the children as it does allow
for better financial assistance at the time. But also it [allows] for [Father] to work
at night." T. 936. On cross-examination, Father testified that he chose to continue
to work part-time at night so that he could care for his children. R. 946. He
explained, "[I]f I worked full-time, then I wouldn't be able to take care of the
children the way I do. Therefore, it's not an option for me because they would
need to go to daycare or have significant changes made to their lives." R. 945.
Grandmother also testified that she only charges Father $200 a month for
the basement apai1.ment. R. 984. She also said that while Father might seek fulltime employment in a year or so, she did not anticipate renting out the apartment
to anyone else. R. 984. She further testified that she was at home with the children
every night and that the separate entrance to the basement apartment was locked.
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R. 985. She said if the children needed anything, they could simply come up the
stairs. R. 976-77.
Based only on this evidence, the trial concluded that Father left his children
"alone each night." R. 672. The trial comt found that this posed a danger to the
"safety and well-being of his children," even though it acknowledged that
Grandmother was at home during those times. R. 672. It also found that "[t]o
accommodate his part-time earnings, [Father] lives in his mother's house and
foregoes child care while he is at work-which is concerning to the Court because
the young children are left unattended during the evening hours." R. 684. Later, it

found again that "continuing the current schedule-i.e., exposing the Minor
Children to risk each night by leaving them unattended-is something that should
not be permitted to continue in the best interest of the Minor Children." R. 686.
Despite evidence to the contraiy, the trial court found that Father's living
arrangements were unsustainable. R. 686. It stated that "while there was no
evidence to suggest that he would not be able to continue to live in his mother's
basement apartment, his current situation is not ideal." R. 686. The trial court did
not explain how it arrived at the conclusion that the multi-generational living
arrangement was "not ideal."

Moral character
The trial court noted that a "large part of the trial focused upon [Father's]
moral character." T. 673.

X
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During the trial, evidence was presented of a criminal episode from 2008.
He had attempted to extort money from a person by threatening to publicize that
the person was gay. R. 670. The trial court found it troubling that Father took his
then two-year-old son with him to attempt to collect the money. R. 670. The
Father ended up serving time in a Maryland jail before moving to Utah and
manying Mother in 2009. R. 670. Despite being troubled by this criminal episode,
the trial court noted that the conviction had since been expunged and recognized
that it had occurred over seven years before the bench trial. R. 673.
In addition to this, Mother made the shocking allegation in her sworn
testimony that Father was a prostitute. R. 674. Initially, Mother only testified that
she had saved some allegedly compromising e-mails from Father on a USB drive,
but that Father had somehow found it and erased the evidence. R. 1056. Her
attorney then said, "You told me earlier you don't want to go into too much detail.
Is that still the case? Okay. We'll just leave it at that then." R. 1056.
The trial court, however, was not comfortable leaving the vague allegations
pending. R. 1057. The judge said, "I've got to make a decision in this case about
what's in these kids' best interest. So if there's some elephant in the room here, I'd
like to know about it.'' R. 1057. Mother then went on to allege that Father was
"offering sexual services" on Craigslist. R. 1057. She claimed that there were
"hundreds, thousands" of e-mails for prostitution going back years. R. 1058. She
also claimed that he had large quantities of cash from the alleged prostitution. R.
1058. Because of the seriousness of these previously undisclosed allegations of
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prostitution, a day was added to the bench trial so that it could be fully addressed.

R. 669.
On May 14, 2015, Mother had the opportunity to present all the evidence
she had that her allegations made under oath were, in fact, true. During her
testimony on the extra day of trial, Mother testified about details that she claimed
to remember from the e-mails and things she claimed Father had said when she
allegedly confronted him. See R. 1116-1133. However, she presented no evidence
that any of her allegations were true.
To explain why she could not produce e-mail evidence from the couple's
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desktop computer, she explained that she had deleted the e-mails because she "felt
bad for him." T. 1134. She also said that she found prostitution e-mails on Father's
cell phone but that she did not make copies of those e-mails because she did not

think it was necessary. R. 1137. She did, however, testify that she tried to save a
USB drive that she claimed she had found to contain compromising pictures of
Father. R. 1139-40. However, she later claimed that she deleted those as well. R.
1146. Or, as she alleged earlier, Father may have found the USB and deleted the
evidence before the divorce. R. 1056. At one point, Father's attorney asked, "So
we have no way of knowing whether the e-mails actually existed or not, other than
your testimony?" R. 1146. Mother replied, "Right." T. 1146.
In regard to the allegations of prostitution, the trial court found that
Mother's testimony "lacked sufficient detail and her reasons for destroying
[Father's] email was tenuous." R. 674. Inexplicably, however, the trial court also
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found that Mother's testimony was credible and that Mother "was telling the truth
about finding various materials on the computers and USB drives at home." R.
674. The trial court found that "although there was nothing solidly linking [Father]
to criminal behavior, the Comt did find [Mother] to be a credible witness. Thus,
[Father's] categorical denials of the alleged conduct causes the Court to question
his veracity and honesty.'' R. 683.

Decision on school attendance
The trial court heard testimony and saw evidence that the children were
thriving academically and socially at their current elementary school. R. 672; see
Petitioner's Exhibit 4. Despite this evidence, the trial court considered only test
scores compared to diversity in dete1mining which school the children should
attend. First it found that Mother's school had better test scores and was therefore
"the better option for the Minor Children." R. 689. It then addressed Father's
contention that his school had better diversity. It found that while Father "argued
that the ethnic diversity of [Father's school] should be considered, the significant
disparity between the schools' academic rankings outweighs any benefits of an
ethnically diverse culture." R. 689.
In a post-judgment motion, Father asked the trial court to also consider the
children's social and emotional well-being in deciding which school the children
should attend. R. 875. In response, the trial court simply restated its position that
test scores were better than ethnic diversity, R. 874, and opined that there was no
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proof that the children would face hardships by changing elementary schools, R.
875.

Fiance's testimony
In this case, rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence had been invoked and
all witnesses except the fiance had been excluded. R. 1036. In response to the trial
court's inquiry, Mother's attorney said he would call the fiance to testify. R. 1035.
Father's attorney objected, saying, "He's been in the courtroom the entire time,
Your Honor.... This isn't a surprise witness. It was known. So ifhe was
intending [to testify], I think he should have been in the hall." R. 1036. The trial
court replied,
Well, I think so too. But, you know, from where I'm sitting
... I think I need to hear from him. I'm a little concerned that he was
here during-I didn't realize that. But ... the concern that I have is
that I want to hear from him, and that probably outweighs any
concerns that I have ... for evidence.
R. 1036.
The trial court stated that the fiance probably would not be able to add
much, but it still wanted to hear from him. R. 1036. Father's attorney restated his
objection and then requested that if the trial court allowed the fiance to testify that
it limit the scope of the testimony. R. 1036. The trial court assured everyone that
the fiance "certainly won't be able to comment on their relationship and the things
that he's heard." R. 103 7.
The next day, the fiance testified that he had a "very strong" relationship
with the children and that they looked forward to seeing him. R. 1092. He also
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stated that his mother was available to care for the children and that he had no
concerns about her watching them. R. 1094. As to employment, the fiance said
that he was working for the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, but was looking to
get a job as a police officer somewhere in the Salt Lake Valley area within a year.
R. 1098. Over Father's objection, the fiance also testified that the children had told

him that Father had told the children that they were not supposed to like him and
that Father did not like him either. R. 1102. Mother had testified earlier that Father
had said mean things about the fiance and that he did not like him. R. 1048-50.

The trial court's conclusions
Both Father and Mother agreed to joint legal and physical custody, and the
trial comt was asked to decide only who would have ultimate decision-making
authority, who would be the primary custodial parent; and which school the
children would attend. R. 680. The parties had agreed to a fifty-fifty split of
parent-time in the summer. R. 680. To make these decisions, the trial court
considered several factors and determined whether each factor favored Father,
favored Mother or was neutral. The children's preference was neutral. R. 681. All
parties agreed to an arrangement that would keep the siblings together, therefore,
that factor was also neutral. R. 680. The relative strength of the children's bond
with Father and Mother was neutral. R. 680. The general interest in maintaining
the status quo was neutral, but only because the trial cowt considered Father's
living arrangements to be unsustainable. R. 682. Otherwise, this factor would have
favored Father.
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On the moral character and emotional stability factor, the trial court
considered Father's expunged criminal episode from seven years before and
considered the unsupported allegations of prostitution from Mother. R. 683. It
found that in "light of all the noted facts and circumstances, and especially the
criminal incident ... , the Court has serious reservations regarding [Father's]
ability to make sound decisions in the best interests of the Minor Children. R. 683.
As a result, this factor weighed heavily in favor of Mother. R. 683.
The ability to function as a parent factor was neutral. R. 684. The duration
and depth of desire for custody factor was neutral. R. 684. The trial court found
that the ability to provide personal rather than sWTogate care factor would have
favored Father because he worked nights and had ample time to volunteer at the
children's school and spend time with them during the day. R. 684. However, the
trial court once again complained that Father was leaving the children "unattended
during the evening hours," even though Grandmother was at home with them. R.
684. At the same time, the trial court found that the fiance would be able to
provide surrogate care for the children while Mother was at work. R. 685. It
therefore concluded that even though this factor currently favored Father, it would
be a neutral factor in the future. R. 685.
The trial court found that the neither parent had a drug or alcohol problem,
therefore, this factor was neutral as well. R. 685. Neither parent had relinquished
custody in the past, so that was neutral. R. 685. There were no concerns about
religious compatibility. R. 686.
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On the factor of kinship, the trial court favored Mother's potential stepparent household over Father's multi-generational household. It found that
Grandmother had a good relationship with the minor childi·en. R. 686. It then
found that the fiance also had a good relationship with the minor children. R. 686.
Inexplicably, the trial court concluded, based on these findings, that this factor
favored Mother. R. 686.
Under the financial factor, the trial court once again complained that Father
was somehow putting the children at risk by leaving them home at night with the
grandmother. R. 686-87. The trial court determined, contrary to the proffered

evidence, that Father would not be able to "continue with this arrangement for an
indefinite time. While there was no evidence to suggest that he would not be able
to continue to live in his mother's basement apartment, his current situation is not
ideal." R. 686. The trial court then considered Mother's income and the fiances
potential income to conclude that the financial factor favored Mother. R. 687.
There was no evidence of abuse or neglect. R. 687. The trial court found
that both Mother and Father needed to work better together, but the factor of
whether the parents could foster a positive relationship was neutral. R. 687. The
factor of communication between the parents was neutral as well. R. 686.
Finally, under a factor that the trial court titled "Other Considerations," it
compared the standardized test scores of Mother's preferred elementary school
with the standardized test scores of the children's current school, and determined
that this outweighed any benefit from ethnic diversity. R. 689. Based on this alone,
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the trial court ordered that the children change elementary schools. R. 689. The
trial court also ruled that Mother would have final decision-making authority. R.
690.

On July 6, 2015, Father filed a post-judgment motion asking the trial court
to amend its findings to remove all references to the unsupported claim that Father
was a prostitute except to indicate that Mother had made baseless allegations of
criminal conduct to the detriment of her own credibility. R. 712. Father also asked
the trial court to consider the other issues now raised on appeal. R. 712-13. The
trial court refused to amend its findings in any way, R. 879, and Father filed a
timely notice of appeal, R. 921.

~-
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ARGUMENT

I. The trial court erred by giving credit to Mother's salacious and entirely
unsubstantiated allegation that Father was a prostitute.
Throughout its decision, the trial court made several references to Mother's

unsupported assertion that Father was a prostitute. Because this allegation was
salacious, inflammatory, and deeply hanning to Father and because there was not
a single scintilla of evidence produced to support it, the trial court erred in giving
it any credit and, as a result, erred in its credibility determination of the witnesses.
In general, "[f]indings of fact based on oral or documentary evidence, shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witness." Utah R. Civ.
P. 52(a). "It is the province of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of
witnesses," and it will not be second-guessed "where there is a reasonable basis to
support its findings." See Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1991). In
general, "a party challenging a factual finding or sufficiency of the evidence to
support a verdict will almost certainly fail to cany its burden of persuasion on
appeal if it fails to marshal" the evidence. See State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,r 42,
326 P.3d 645.

Even granted all the deference that is due to the trial court as the trier of
fact, the findings on the prostitution allegations were clearly erroneous. The trial
1

court made a credibility determination based on the allegation, but that
determination also lacks a reasonable basis in fact. The following is a marshaling
of all the evidence on the record regarding Mother's claim that Father was a
prostitute:
C'\
'4'

1. Mother first raised only vague allegations of misconduct involving emails, and her attorney seemed to discourage her from the topic. R.
1056. Her attorney said, "You told me earlier you don't want to go into
too much detail. Is that still the case? Okay. We'll just leave it at that
then." R. I 056.
2. Mother, however, went on to allege that Father was "offering sexual
services" on Craigslist. R. 1057. She claimed that there were "hundreds,
thousands" of e-mails for prostitution going back years. R. 1058. She
also claimed that he had large quantities of cash from the alleged
prostitution. R. 1058.
3. Mother later testified in a day of trial scheduled specifically for the
prostitution charges that she now remembered details from the e-mails
and things she claimed Father had said when she allegedly confronted
him. See R. 1116-1133. Beyond her testimony, however, she presented
no evidence.
4. To explain why she could not produce e-mail evidence from the
couple's desktop computer, she explained that she had deleted the emails because she "felt bad for him." R. 1134.
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5. She also said that she found prostitution e-mails on Father's cell phone
but that she did not make copies of those e-mails because she did not

think it was necessary. R. 1137. She did, however, testify that she tried
to save a USB drive that she claimed she had found to contain
compromising pictures of Father. R. 1139-40. However, she later
claimed that she deleted those as well. R. 1146. Or, as she alleged
earlier, Father may have found the USB and deleted the evidence before
the divorce. R. 1056.

6. At one point, Father's attorney asked, "So we have no way of knowing
whether the e-mails actually existed or not, other than your testimony?"
R. 1146. Mother replied, "Right." R. 1146.

7. In contrast, Father's testimony directly refuted all the details of
Mother's unsupported allegations. R. 1188-1204.
8. Father provided a screenshot of all of his Craigslist postings from his email address. R. 1198. Besides postings regarding a condo and a car
seat, there were no e-mails involving Craigslist. R. 1199.
Based on all of this, the trial court determined that Mother's "testimony
lacked sufficient detail and her reasons for destroying [Father's] email was
tenuous." R. 674. Inexplicably, the trial court nevertheless found Mother's
allegations to be credible and her account to be true. Id. The trial court determined
that the years of prostitution had not endangered the children, but it also found that
the prostitution reflected poorly on Father's moral character. This obviously
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inconsistent result seems to indicate that the trial court was aware of the lack of
basis for this determination. If Fath.er truly was a prostitute as Mother claimed,
committing countless sex acts for money over the course of several years, then
there is no way to conclude that this kind of behavior would not endanger the
children in any way. If Mother truly believed that Father was a practicing
prostitute for years, then she should have taken steps to protect her children from
r·,

his blatantly criminal and morally reprehensible behavior. It seems the trial court
is attempting to find Mother's claims credible while not finding that she allowed
her children to be endangered by the alleged criminal activity. It therefore ruled
that

although there was nothing solidly linking [Father] to defined
criminal behavior, the Court did find [Mother] to be a credible
witness. Thus, [Father's] categorical denials of the alleged conduct
causes the Court to question his veracity and honesty.
R. 683. As a result, the trial court seems to find that Father was a prostitute when it

would reflect negatively on his character, but that Father was not a prostitute when
it would reflect negatively on Mother's lack of effort to protect her children or
lack of honesty on the witness stand. As Father argued in his motion to amend the
judgment, Mother's testimony cannot be untrue and credible at the same time. R.
767. "[E]ither [Father] is a prostitute and is engaging in immoral and illegal
activities, or [Mother's] testimony was not credible." Id. The trial court even
admitted that "there is insufficient evidence to show that [Father's] actions were
illegal or otherwise placed the Minor Children in harm's way." R. 674. Still, it
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believed the allegations to be true and relied upon them to make a determination of
Father's moral character. R. 682-83.
There was absolutely no evidence presented, beyond Mother's self-serving
assertions, that Father had ever prostituted himself in any way. The trial court
recognized that her story lacked detail and that her reasons for destroying the only
evidence were tenuous. It was clearly erroneous, therefore, for the trial court to
have given any weight to the allegations. To add insult to injury, the trial court
actually discounted Father's credibility for vehemently denying the allegations.
There is an apt Latin proverb on this subject: Quod gratis asseritur, gratis

negatur-What is asserted without evidence may be denied without evidence.
Mother made a salacious and wholly unsupported claim against Father. The only
possible response to such a charge is to deny it, and to deny it categorically. As a
result, there is no evidence to support the trial court's findings that Mother's
testimony was true and that she was a credible witness.

A. The prostitution allegations harmed Father's substantial rights in
the proceeding.
The false allegations of prostitution were highly prejudicial in this
proceeding even though neither Father nor Mother have an unspotted record on
moral issues. If an error "affects the substantial rights of the parties," a court must
not disregard it. See Utah R. Civ. P. 61.
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An error is hannful when "absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood
of a more favorable outcome for the appe11ant." See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1208 (Utah 1993).

Despite the fact that both Mother and Father have had moral failings in the
past, the inflammatory false allegation of prostitution was still prejudicial to
Father. It is true that Father had a lapse of judgment seven years before the trial
that resulted in a criminal conviction. R. 670, 673. But it is also true that Mother
had lapses in moral judgment as well, although none that involved a crime. The
trial court found that Mother had "engaged in 'phone sex' and sent nude

photographs of herself to someone she met online after the parties were separated,
but while the Minor Children were living with her." R. 674.
So while neither party had a spotless moral record, only Father was accused
of being a prostitute. This charge is so salacious and inflammatory that it is
practically per se prejudicial. How can a trial court conclude that a parent has been
a prostitute for years while living in the familial home and then consider that a
harmless detail? The outcome would have been better for Father if the trial court
had not believed the allegations that Father was a prostitute. Even considering the
past criminal episode, it is seemingly untenable to claim that this would not have
harmed Father in any way. Instead, it is likely that Father would have had a better
outcome absent the unsupported allegations of prostitution. It is also important to
note that if the trial court had not believed Mother's unsupported allegations, this
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would have hurt her credibility. Thus, it was even more likely that the trial court
would have found a more favorable result for Father.
Considering the mutual history, the inflammatory and salacious nature of
the allegation, and the subsequent credibility determination, it is clear that the trial
court's clearly erroneous findings prejudiced Father in this case.
II. The Court's findings are insufficient to support its conclusion that Father

endangered the children by leaving them alone a night.
The trial court found that Father was putting the safety of his children at
risk by leaving the them alone each night while he went to work, but there is no
reasonable basis in evidence to support this conclusion.
In general, "[fjindings of fact based on oral or documentary evidence, shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witness." Utah R. Civ.
P. 52(a). "It is the province of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of
witnesses," and it will not be second-guessed "where there is a reasonable basis to
support its findings." See Reedv. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1991). In
general, "a party challenging a factual finding or sufficiency of the evidence to
support a verdict will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on
appeal if it fails to marshal" the evidence. See State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,r 42,
326 P.3d 645.
The following is a marshaling of all the evidence regarding this issue:
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1. Father "lives in the basement of his mother's house." R. 672.
2. The basement apartment is "a separate ... apartment with two
bedrooms." R. 672.
3. "The Minor Children share a bedroom." R. 672.
4. "The basement apartment has its own entrance." R. 672.
5. Father worked at night from 9 p.m. to 2 a.m. R. 672.
6. Both Father and Grandmother "testified that [Grandmother] is upstairs
every evening and can hear the children if they need anything." R. 672.
7. The separate entrance to the basement apartment is locked when Father is
working at nights and the children have never left the apartment without an adult
being aware. R. 985.
Based only on this evidence, the trial court concluded that Father was
putting the children at risk each night by leaving them W1attended while he
worked. R. 672, 684, 686-87. But the uncontroverted testimony is that the
children were at home with their Grandmother, who was just up the stairs and
could hear them if they needed anything during the night. The trial court is
apparently ruling that anyone caring for minor children must sleep on the same
level of the house as the children. Otheiwise they are leaving their children
unattended at night. Such a conclusion is unwarranted and is not supported by any
basis in the evidence.
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This erroneous conclusion greatly prejudiced Father in the proceeding. The
trial court relied on this finding to draw negative inferences against Father in the
factors of surrogate care, R. 684, and financial conditions, R. 686-87.
Because the trial court clearly erred in determining that Father put his
children at risk at night by leaving them unattended when they were undisputedly
at home with Grandmother, and because this error harmed Father, this Court
@

should reverse and remand.

Ill. The trial court favored a step-parent household over a multigenerational
household without a sufficient basis in the evidence.
Throughout its decision, the trial court expressed a preference for Mother's
potential step-parent household structure over the admittedly stable and
functioning multigenerational household structure of Father's family without any
reasonable basis in evidence. As noted earlier, a trial court must have a reasonable
basis to support its findings. See Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1991).
In Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987), this Court made it clear
that it will not condone a finding of fact that penalizes a woman for not adhering
to the "traditional role." Id. at 203-04. While the rule in Marchant was applied to
a custody determination that penalized a woman for working outside of the home,
the same principle could apply to a man who is the primary caregiver or to a man
who lives in a multigenerational household. In any event, a parent's perceived
failure to adhere to a judge's traditional view of family life should never be a
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factor in a detetmination of custody. The U.S. Census Bureau defines
multigenerational households to include "a household, a child of the householder,
and a grandchild of the householder." Daphne A. Lofquist, Multigenerational

Households: 2009-2011), www.Census.gov (October 2012), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/acsbrl 1-03 .pelf. According to the Pew
Research Center, "[a] record 57 million Americans, or 18.1% of the population of
the United States, lived in multi-generational family households in 2012, double
the number who lived in such households in 1980." Richard Fry and Jeffrey S.
Passel, In Post-Recession Era, Young Adults Drive Continuing Rise in Multi-

Generational Living, Pew Research Center (July 17, 2014), available at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/07/17/in-postrecession-era-young-adultsdrive-continuing-rise-in-multi-generational-living/#fn-19695-1. So, while
multigenerational households are increasingly popular because of the financial
stability and benefits to family life, they are still a minority family structure in the
United States.
In this case, there was no evidence presented and no findings made to
explain why a more traditional step-parent household should be treated any
differently than a slightly less traditional multigenerational household. The only
relevant evidence was that Grandmother testified that she only charges Father
$200 a month for the basement apartment. R. 984. She also said that while Father
might seek full-time employment in a year or so, she did not anticipate renting out
the apartment to anyone else. R. 984.
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The trial court, however, found that Father's multigenerational household
was "not ideal." R. 686. While the trial court concluded that Mother's fiance "will
likely be able to be a surrogate caretaker of the Minor Children," see R. 685, the
trial court at the same time found that Father was "exposing the Minor Children to
risk each night" by leaving them in the house with Grandmother, see R. 686.
There is no evidentiary basis to explain why the fiance would be an acceptable
surrogate care provider while the children's biological grandmother would not.
Under the analysis of financial conditions, the trial court considered the fact
that the fiance's income will be added to Mother's and concluded that Mother's

"financial situation is better than [Father's]." R. 687. There is no explanation,
however, about why the trial court did not also consider Grandmother's income in
Father's favor. In fact, the trial court treated the financial benefits of a
multigenerational household as a liability for Father, citing his reduced monthly
rent as evidence of instability and unsustainability. See R. 686.
Most tellingly, the trial court admitted that there was no basis in the
evidence for its conclusions. It wrote, "[W]hile there is no evidence to suggest that
[Father] would not be able to continue to live in his mother's basement apartment,
his current situation is not ideal." R. 686 ( emphasis added). Based on this, the trial
court concluded that the financial situation factor favored Mother. R. 686-87. It
also relied on this assumption to support its conclusion that kinship factor favored
Mother, albeit slightly. R. 686. Finally, the trial court relied on this assumption to
11

determine that the factor of the ability to provide personal rather than surrogate
care currently favored Father, but that his situation was unsustainable and this
factor would ultimately be neutral. R. 685. As a result, Father was prejudiced by
the error to assume that multigenerational households are less stable or somehow
less desirable than the more traditional step-parent household. Therefore, this
Court should reverse and remand.
IV. The trial court erred in considering only standardized test scores
compared to diversity in making a determination about which school the
children should attend.
In determining which school the children should attend, the trial court only
considered standardized test scores and diversity, but refused to consider the
children's psychological and emotional needs. When considering a change to a
joint custody arrangement, a trial court should consider the impact on the best
interests of the children as articulated in Utah Code section 30-3-10.2.
This includes the "emotional needs ... of the child" and "the preference of
the child." See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2(2)(a), (f) (LexisNexis 2013). The trial
court, however, did not consider the children's preference, their emotional needs,
or the general interest of maintaining the status quo when it ordered the children to
attend a new elementary school. See R. 680-81. Instead the trial court analyzed the
school question under "other considerations" as an addendum to the factors in the
best-interests analysis. See R. 688-89. One of the most traumatic things that can
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happen to a young child is to change schools. They lose all their friends and
academic support system. It is massive deviation from the status quo. In this case,
Father has actually changed jobs to work at the children's elementary school. See

R. 717. Furthermore, Father presented evidence that showed the children were
thriving at their current school and exceeding the standardized-test requirements.
The trial court did not consider the fact that the children were in a school where
they had friends and were thriving and where one of their parents would see them
every day. Instead, the children were transferred to a new school based solely on
the school's standardized test scores and the convenience of the parent-time

schedule. See R. 689. Because this change in school is not in the best interests of
the children and because the trial court failed to analyze the impact of such a
change within that framework, this Court should reverse and remand.

V. Mother's fiance should not have been allowed to testify.
Despite Father's objections, Mother's fiance was allowed to testify even
though he was present in the courtroom during the trial and all other witnesses
were excluded under rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. "At a party's
request, the court must order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear other
witnesses' testimony." Utah R. Evid. 615.
A judge may exempt a party from the operation of rule 615 if the witness is
a "person whose presence party shows to be essential to presenting the party's
claim or defense." Id. R. 615(c). If a party challenges a judge's decision to exempt
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a witness from being excluded, the party must show that it was prejudiced by the
decision. State v. Billsie, 2006 UT 13, 'lf 6, 131 P.3d 239.
In this case, rule 615 had been invoked and all witnesses should have been
excluded. Mother's attorney said he could call the fiance to testify, if it would help
the trial court. R. 1035. Father's att01ney objected, saying, "He's been in the
courtroom the entire time, Your Honor .... This isn't a surprise witness. It was
known. So if he was intending [to testify], I think he should have been in the hall."
R. 1036. The trial court replied,
Well, I think so too. But, you know, from where I'm sitting
... I think I need to hear from him. I'm a little concerned that he was
here during-I didn't realize that. But ... the concern that I have is
that I want to hear from him, and that probably outweighs any
concerns that I have ... for evidence.

R. 1036.
At no point in time did Mother or the trial court attempt to argue that an
exception to rule 615 applied to the fiance. The trial court stated that the fiance
probably would not be able to add much, but it still wanted to hear from him. R.
1036. Father's attorney restated his objection and then requested that if the trial
court allowed the fiance to testify that it limit the scope of the testimony. R. 1036.
The trial court assured everyone that the fiance "certainly won't be able to
comment on their relationship and the things that he's heard." R. 1037.
That is exactly what the fiance testified about during the second day of the
trial. The fiance testified that he had a "very strong" relationship with the children
and that they looked forward to seeing him. R. 1092. He also stated that his mother
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was available to care for the children and that he had no concerns about her
watching them. R. 1094. As to employment, the fiance said that he was working
for the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, but was looking to get a job as a police
officer somewhere in the Salt Lake Valley area within a year. R. 1098. In his job
at the time, he ea1ned around $35,000. R. 1098. Over Father's objection, the fiance
also testified that the children had told him that Father had told the children that
they were not supposed to like him and that Father did not like him either. R.
1102. This was particularly egregious because Mother had testified that Father had
said mean things about the fiance and that he did not like him. R. 1048-50. This is
precisely the kind of hatm that rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence is intended
to avoid.
This error was prejudicial because the trial court found the fiance to be a
credible witness that supported Mother's position. See R. 679. Of the fiance, the
Court wrote, "He testified of [Mother's] positive parenting abilities and his good
relationship with the Minor Children. Mr. Barnes appeared to be a credible witness
and a positive role model." Id. In the best-interests analysis, the trial court relied
on the fiance' s testimony to conclude that he "will likely be able to be a surrogate
caretaker of the Minor Children." R. 685. Under the kinship section of the bestinterests analysis, the trial court wrote: "The Court, having observed [the fiance]
testify, believes that he testified credibly, cares for the Minor Children, and will
likely act as a capable and caring step-parent." R. 686. The Court concluded that
this factor of the analysis favored Mother. Id. The trial court also considered the
15

fiance' s testimony about his income in determining that the financial factor of the
best-interests analysis favored Mother. R. 687. Finally, the fiance was able to
bolster Mother's contention that Father would not foster a good relationship with
the fiance. The trial court agreed with Mother and found that Father "may be
unable to support a positive relationship" with the fiance. R. 688.
The fiance, however, had an unfair advantage. He was able to observe how
everyone else testified. He could see which factors the trial cowt deemed
important and adjust his testimony accordingly. As a result, he was able to
significantly bolster Mother's case in a way that prejudiced Father. For this error,
the Court should reverse and remand.

VI. Cumulative error has prejudiced Father.

("'\
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Each one of the errors described above was harmful to Father in shifting the
balance of the factors in favor of Mother. However, even if all of the above errors
are deemed individually harmless, the cumulative effect of the errors has
prejudiced Father. When the cumulative effect of several errors undermines
confidence in a decision, the Court should vacate the trial court's decision. See

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993). In this case, the cumulative
effect of the several errors described above requires this Com1 to reverse and
remand.
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CONCLUSION
.®

For the foregoing reasons, Father respectfully requests this Court to reverse
and remand.
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ADDENDUM
No addendum is needed.
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